LITIGATION
UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee,

_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 2187,
No. 87-1269 (Feb. 22, 1988).

Court Voids California Law Prohibiting
Party Endorsements in Primaries
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously struck down a California law that
prohibited party endorsements in primaries as a violation of the First Amendment. The Court also stuck several laws
governing the composition of parties'
governing bodies, and regulating party
chairs.
The suit was brought by members of
all major political parties in California,
various county central committees, and
other political partisans. The suit challenged, inter alia, Elections Code section 11702, which barred central committee endorsements in primaries; Elections
Code section 29430, which made it a
misdemeanor for any candidate to claim
party endorsement in a primary; and
various provisions regulating parties' internal affairs by setting the numbers,
terms, selection, and removal of party
officials, terms of chairs of central committee chairs, and requiring that the
chair alternate between citizens of northern and southern California. A challenge
to a state ban on party endorsements in
nonpartisan elections is being litigated
separately. See Unger v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 612 (1984), and Geary v.
Renne, No. C-87-4724 (N.D. Cal.),
stayed, 856 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1988).
The trial court granted summary judgment on all issues, holding that the statutes impermissibly violated First and
Fourteenth Amendments rights to freedom of speech and free assembly. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme
Court vacated the decision and remanded
in light of a recent decision. The Ninth
Circuit again affirmed.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, joined by all other justices except
Justice Stevens, who concurred, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no
part, affirmed. The Court held that the
proffered reasons for the various statutes, all of which essentially stemmed
from concerns over the statute's purported interest in preventing intraparty factionalism and infighting, were not sufficiently compelling to justify the clear
infringements on speech and association.
The Court raised, considered, and rejected these concerns for each statute. At
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bottom, the Court held that although a
state is free to regulate the conduct of
its elections to ensure that they are free
of taint and are orderly, that interest
does not extend into the internal workings of political parties. To justify the
intrusions here, the state must meet an
exacting test: it must show a "compelling
governmental purpose", with a remedy
"narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Justice Stevens wrote separately to express his discomfort with the formulation of that test, although he concurred
in the result.
Blanchard v. Bergeron,

_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 2083,
No. 87-1485 (Feb. 21, 1989).

Court Permits Attorneys' Fees
in Excess of Contingent Fee
Agreement in Civil Rights Case
The U.S. Supreme Court has unanimously held that in a civil rights case
the plaintiff is not limited to an attorneys' fee equal to what the attorney
could have received under the contingent
fee agreement between the attorney and
plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought suit in federal
court for the Western District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging excessive force by a local sheriff.
After trial by jury, the plaintiff was
awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and a like amount in punitive damages. He sought $40,000 in attorneys'
fees and costs under section 1988. The
trial court awarded $7,500 in fees, and
$886.92 in costs. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reduced the award, feeling bound
by an earlier decision that a contingent
fee agreement serves to cap the amount
that may be awarded. The fee agreement
here was for a standard 40% of the
award. The Fifth Circuit reduced the
award to $4,000. Other circuits have a
contrary role, and do not cap attorneys'
fee awards according to contingent contracts.
The Supreme Court, per Justice
White, joined by all justices except Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment, held that "a
contingent fee contract does not impose
an absolute ceiling on an award of attorneys' fees and to hold otherwise would
be inconsistent with the statute and its
policy and purpose." The basis for a fee
award is whatever is a reasonable fee,
and although the attorneys' fee agreement is one factor, it is not dispositive
or binding on the court. Just as an
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agreement might require too large an
award to be reasonable, so too it might
be inadequate to assure an award sufficient to compensate the attorney and
attract counsel to civil rights cases. This
is particularly true in civil rights cases,
where the rights and remedies are frequently nonpecuniary in nature, and a fee
fixed as a percentage of such nonpecuniary rights would often be inadequate.
Texas State Teachers Association
v. Garland Indep. School Dist.,

_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 4012,
No. 87-1759 (Mar. 28, 1989).

Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees
Under Civil Rights Statute Not Limited
to Cases Where Plaintiff Prevails
on "Central Issue"
The U.S. Supreme Court has unanimously held that a civil rights plaintiff
need not prevail on the "central issue"
or achieve the "primary relier' sought in
order to be the prevailing party eligible
for an award of attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. section 1988.
Plaintiff teachers union filed suit in
I 981 to challenge the school district's
ban on communications among and with
teachers regarding employee organization
during the school day. In particular, the
union challenged the district's regulation
prohibiting representatives of the union
from the school during the day, and
banning use of the school mail or other
internal communications for such organizations. Meetings between the teachers
and organizations were permitted at the
school during non-school hours, but only
with the approval of the principal.
The trial court granted defendants'
motions for summary judgment on all
grounds, except for the challenge to the
requirement of principal permission to
meet after school hours, which the court
called "trivial", as the regulation had
never been enforced. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed and reversed. It agreed
that there was no constitutional violation
in banning union representatives from
school grounds during the school day,
under the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
( 1983). The appellate court reversed,
however, on the issue of the bans on
teacher-to-teacher communications regarding union activities, specifically
holding unconstitutional the prohibition
on teacher communication or use of the
internal mail system. That judgment was
summarily affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
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Court. 479 U.S. 801 (1987).
The union then applied for attorneys'
fees under section I 988. Both the trial
and appellate courts rejected the request,
holding that the union was not the prevailing party as interpreted in the Fifth
Circuit. That circuit required that a party
prevail on the "central issue" in the suit
in order to be awarded fees as the prevailing party. Here, both courts held
that the central issue was gaining access
to school facilities and personnel during
school hours, and the union lost on this
point, despite obtaining success on "significant secondary issues."
The Supreme Court, per Justice
O'Connor for a unanimous Court, reversed. The Court held that so long as
the plaintiff succeeds on "any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some
of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit, the plaintiff has crossed the
threshold to a fee award of some kind."
Any other standard, the Court held,
would be inconsistent with its earlier
decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983), which held that a party
need not prevail on every issue raised in
order to be entitled to fees under section
I 988. At minimum, the Court held, "to
be considered a prevailing party within
the meaning of section 1988 the plaintiff
must be able to point to a resolution of
the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant."
U.S. Department of Justice, et al.,
v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, et al.,

_U.S.___, 89 D.A.R. 3715,
No. 87-1379(Mar. 22, 1989).

Criminal Record "Rap Sheet"
Not Accessible Under
Freedom of Information Act
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the public has no right of access to the
FBI's criminal history files under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The FBI collects and maintains criminal record histories on millions of persons, using information compiled from
various local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The FBI refused a
request by a CBS news correspondent
and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press to release these criminal "rap sheets" on four reputed Mafia
members. Respondents then filed suit in
federal court under the FOIA, seeking
the record of one Charles Medico, insofar as it contained "matters of public
record." The parties filed cross-motions
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for summary judgment. The district court
granted the Department of Justice's motion, finding that the information requested was protected under three separate exemptions of the FOIA. The U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice
Stevens (joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, with a concurrence on this
issue by Justices Blackmun and Brennan), reversed, holding that (I) the disclosure of such information to a third
party is prohibited by Exemption 7(C)
of the FOIA, because it "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy";
and (2) in circumstances where Exemption 7(C) is facially applicable, the FOIA
gives public access to government agency
records only if the information has a
bearing on the agency's own performance; that is, if it "is likely to contribute
significantly to public understanding of
the operations or activities of the government...." 5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(4)
(A)(iii).
Justices Blackmun and Brennan, concurring in the judgment, objected to the
majority's "categorical balancing" of the
interests under Exemption (7)(C).

CALIFORNIA
COURTS OF APPEAL
Consumers Union v.
Fisher Development,

_Cal. App. 3d___, 89 D.A.R. 4108,
No. A035787 (1st Dist., Mar. 28, 1989).

Consumer Group Has Standing
To Enforce Unfair Business
Practices Act
The First District Court of Appeal
has held that a consumer group may sue
under the Unfair Business Practices Act,
Business and Profession Code section
17200, to enforce provisions of the Unruh Antidiscrimination Act, Civil Code
section 51 et seq.
Consumers Union is a membership
group and the publisher of Consumer
Reports magazine. The group filed suit
against a housing developer, challenging
that an exclusive development did not
meet the standards to be a senior citizen
enclave, and so the developer was discriminating on the basis of age and
against families with children. Plaintiffs
did not have standing under the operative statute in the Unruh Act, Civil Code
section 51, 51.2, 51.3, and 52, as the
group was not an "aggrieved party" as

that term is defined in the statutes. However, the group filed under the Unfair
Business Practices Act, Business and Professions Code section 17200, which generally provides a cause of action to "any
person" to enjoin any business practice
that is in violation of any law. Defendants demurred on the ground that the
group lacked standing under the Unruh
Act and could not "bootstrap" standing
through the Business and Professions
Code. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer.
The First District, per Justices BarryDeal, Merrill, and White, reversed. The
court noted that section 17200 has consistently been held to confer the broadest
standing to any person to enforce its
provisions, and that the Act generally
prohibits any business practice that is
unfair, including any practice in violation of any other law.
City of Sacramento v. Drew,

_Cal. App. 3d___, 89 D.A.R. 1943
No. C002305 (Feb. 14, 1989).

Private Citizen A warded Attorneys'
Fees For Public Interest Advocacy
In Response to City Action
The Third District Court of Appeal
has ruled that a private citizen is entitled
to attorneys' fees in a public interest
advocacy case, even where the advocate
does not initiate the action.
The City of Sacramento passed a
resolution of intention to assess residents
for the cost of certain school construction, under the authority of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913. Property
owner Drew protested, arguing that the
construction was not authorized under
the Act. The City filed an action to
determine whether the assessment was
authorized. Drew filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. Drew then moved for attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The court denied the
motion.
The Third District Court of Appeal,
per Justice Blease, reversed, holding that,
according to section 1021.5, a private
citizen is entitled to attorneys' fees in a
matter that (I) has brought significant
benefit to the public; (2) requires private
enforcement; and (3) demonstrates a financ.iH! burden on the private citizen.
Drew met all the statutory requirements
and was therefore entitled to attorneys'
fees. It was irrelevant that Drew did not
commence the action, or that the court
might have invalidated the bond act without his intervention.

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989)

LITIGATION
CALIFORNIA
SUPERIOR COURTS
People v. Safeway Stores, Inc., et al.,

No. 89576 (San Francisco
Superior Court).

Proposition 65 En/orcement
Suit To Be Heard
The San Francisco Superior Court
cleared the way for the first major enforcement lawsuit under Proposition 65,
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxics
Enforcement Act of 1986.
The suit, brought by Attorney General John Van de Kamp, alleges that
Safeway Stores and four other retailers
failed to properly warn consumers of
the dangers of cigar and pipe tobacco.
Four environmental groups intervened
in the suit. The toll-free service, which
the store uses in an attempt to comply
with Proposition 65, is also named.
Twenty-five tobacco companies, originally named in the suit, agreed to put
warning labels on their products, and
settled in October 1988. (See CRLR
Vol. 9, No. I (Winter 1989) p. 83 for
background information.)
Defendants' demurrer to the complaint of the Attorney General was rejected on March 15. In the latest development, San Francisco Superior Court
Judge Stuart Pollak rejected defendants'
demurrer to the complaint in intervention of the environmental groups, clearing the way for the lawsuit to proceed.
A related case involving the toll-free
service, Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, No. 504601
(Sacramento Superior Court), was set
for hearing on May 25.
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